This paper applies time series analysis to distinguish between cyclical and demographic causes of the decline of the labor force participation rate. Some public discussions suggest that the decline of US unemployment from its 2009 peak of 10 percent to about 6 percent by mid-2014 grossly exaggerates recovery because most of the decline reflects the exit of discouraged workers from the labor force. This study finds instead that one-half to two-thirds of the decline in labor force participation by about 3 percentage points from late 2007 to early 2014 is attributable to aging of the population. Although about one-third is found attributable to the lagged influence of high, and especially long-term, unemployment, going forward the potential rebound in the participation rate from recovery is projected to be approximately offset by further aging of the population.
IntroductIon
How much is US unemployment currently understated because of worker discouragement and exit from the labor force? Correspondingly, what portion of the decline in labor force participation should be considered structural/demographic as opposed to cyclical? Much of the recent public policy discourse seems to assume that there is enormous hidden unemployment disguised by the decline in participation.
Thus, a recent New York Times editorial questions whether the June 2014 unemployment rate of 6.1 percent was meaningful, because "the jobless rate would be 9.6 percent, if it counted nearly six million people who would be looking for work or working if the economy were stronger." 1 The urgency of further fiscal and monetary stimulus would of course be much greater if the true unemployment rate were 9.6 percent instead of 6.1 percent. However, although the labor force participation rate has indeed fallen substantially, this study finds that about one-half to two-thirds of the decline is attributable to aging of the labor force rather than worker discouragement in the Great Recession and its aftermath. Correspondingly, the unemployment rate is only about 1.5 percentage points lower than it would be if there had been no worker discouragement from recent high unemployment and poor conditions in job markets. "True" unemployment of 7.6 percent would still be uncomfortably high, but would be more consistent with the Federal Reserve's tapering of quantitative easing toward expected completion of asset purchases by
October 2014 (Federal Reserve 2014, 10) .
AgIng And LAbor Force PArtIcIPAtIon
The aging of the baby boom generation has contributed to a decline of the labor force participation rate beginning in about 2000, following its long upward climb in earlier decades. For all workers aged 16 years or older, the labor force participation rate rose from 59 percent in the mid-1960s to about 67 percent in 1999, before falling back to about 63 percent in 2013 (BLS 2014c) . For its part, the high unemployment during the Great Recession further contributed to falling participation by discouraging potential workers.
The share of persons 55 years and older in the population of persons 16 years and older has risen from 27.1 percent in 2000 to 33.6 percent in 2013 33.6 percent in (BLS 2014c . Labor force participation is lower for the older persons. Thus, in 2002 the labor force participation rate was 34.5 percent for persons 55 and older, compared to 78.8 percent for persons aged 16 to 54. 2 If the age-specific participation rates had remained the same, the aging of the population from 2000 to 2013 should have caused a reduction in the total labor force participation rate (age 16 and older ) by 2.88 percentage points. 3 Considering that the adult population share of the 55 and older group rose by 6.5 percentage points from 2000 to 2013, the implication is that each percentage point rise in this group's share in adult population reduces the labor force participation rate by 0.44 percentage points. Figure 1 shows the path of the labor force participation rate over this period (P) on the left-hand scale, and the percent of the adult population in the 55 and older group on the right-hand scale. Visual inspection of the two trends strongly suggests that population aging has reduced the participation rate over the past 14 years. However, it also suggests that there was a temporary increase in participation associated with the housing boom (2006), followed by an acceleration in the longer-term decline associated with the Great Recession. The estimates below seek to identify what portion of the total decline has been attributable to aging, and what portion is attributable to exit from the labor force as a consequence of discouragement by adverse labor market conditions.
ModeL estIMAtes
The estimates that follow use monthly data from January 2000 through May 2014, for males and females separately. The model specifies the labor force participation rate (P) to be a function of the fraction of the 16 years and older population that is in the 55 years and older group, the lagged unemployment rate, and the lagged rate of long-term unemployment (27 weeks and more). The unemployment rate peaked The estimation results are as follows. For males: and older has a more moderate influence for females than males but still contributes to the declining participation rate. The influence of the shift for 2008 and after turns out not only to be significant but also to be positive. A possible implication is that the Great Recession put pressure on households to send wives into the labor force as second earners. Similarly, when evaluated at maximum unemployment of 10 percent as against benchmark unemployment of 5 percent, the quadratic formulation of the lagged unemployment turns out to cause an increase in the participation rate by 1.16 percentage points.
However, high lagged long-term unemployment does have the expected participation-depressing effect, and is considerably more powerful than for males. Thus, applying the coefficients from equation (2) to the exercise just discussed for males, the peak minus benchmark long-term unemployment rate (4.4 percent versus 0.9 percent) would cause a negative impact of 2.0 percentage points on the female participation rate (= 3.5 x [−0.5788]). Figure 2 shows the actual and equation-predicted path of male labor force participation for the population aged 16 years and older; figure 3 shows the same comparison for females.
IMPAct oF AgIng Versus cycLIcAL dIscourAgeMent eFFects
For policy purposes, the principal question is whether and to what extent the influence of recent unemployment (and long-term unemployment) has depressed the participation rate below levels it would rebound to under more normal circumstances. The flip side of this question is whether the presently observed unemployment rate, 6.1 percent, is understating the "true" unemployment rate by failing to include as unemployed those workers who have left the labor force but would return to it under more normal conditions.
Equations (1) and (2) can be used to investigate this question. From December 2007 to May 2014, the fraction of the 16 years and older population that was 55 years or older rose from 28.9 percent to 32.6 percent for males and from 31.6 percent to 35.5 percent for females (BLS 2014c) . Applying the respective coefficients from equations (1) and (2), population aging contributed a predicted reduction of 2.3 percentage points for the male labor force participation rate and 1.1 percentage points for the female rate. 6 The decline in the total predicted participation rates was 3.5 percentage points for males and 1.66 percentage points for females (applying equations [1] and [2] the observed unemployment rate is about 1.5 percent lower than the rate would have been if there had been no discouragement effect from the Great Recession. Viewed from another standpoint, the amount of success to date in reducing unemployment from its peak of 10 percent might be better gauged against achieving a reduction to 7.6 percent, where the rate would stand without exit from the labor force by those discouraged, than by the full decline to the observed 6.1 percent level.
The diagnosis that the "true" unemployment rate is on the order of 7.5 percent rather than 6 percent is consistent with the IMF (2014) estimate that for 2014 US GDP will average 3.3 percent below potential output. That is: If a benchmark of 5.5 percent is used for the "natural" or "full employment" unemployment rate, then "true" excess unemployment is on the order of 2 percentage points. By Okun's law, according to which the process of labor hoarding means that firms are slow to fire even as output falls and thus have capacity to increase output more than their proportionate increase in the number of workers during recovery, each percentage point reduction in unemployment generates a 2 percentage point increase in output. So the output gap would be 4 percent (2 percent for excess true unemployment, times 2), which is close to the IMF estimate of 3.3 percent.
coMPArIson to other estIMAtes
The central estimates here are that a 1.7 to 2. These patterns are expected to continue, offsetting LFPR improvement due to economic recovery."
The study also projects that by 2020 the participation rate would be down to 62.4 percent, or 2.7
percentage points below the level in December 2011. classification of persons as being out of the labor force even though they were still searching for jobs; 0.5 percentage points to rising dependency on disability benefits; and some portion of the remaining 1 percentage point to disincentives from high effective marginal tax rates on beneficiaries of food stamps and Medicaid.
Alan B. Krueger, Judd Cramer, and David Cho (2014) examine the role of long-term unemployment in the Great Recession. They find that whereas the total unemployment rate has been so high that the usual expectations-based Phillips curve relating the change in inflation to the 8 unemployment rate would have predicted steeper disinflation than has occurred, and similarly the Beveridge curve relating the job vacancy rate to the unemployment rate has been displaced to a less efficient frontier, both curves behave much more as expected when the unemployment rate used excludes long-term unemployment. Correspondingly, they conclude that as of early 2014, "further declines in short-term unemployment would be expected to be associated with rising inflation and stronger real wage growth" (2014, 5) . For the participation rate, the main implication of their study is that high long-term unemployment leads indirectly to lower participation because there is a relatively high exit rate of the long-term unemployed. They find that since the beginning of the Great Recession, of those already unemployed 27 weeks or more in a given month, by 15 months later 30 percent have exited from the labor force, while 34 percent remain unemployed and 36 percent have found jobs (albeit of below-par permanency) (2014, 37) . Their exit impact estimate is broadly consistent with the coefficients on long-term unemployment found in equations (1) and (2). (2013, 1) . However, the CEA study also notes that the influence of the aging factor accelerated after 2010, indicating a greater relative 9. With a peak of 4.4 percent long-term unemployment in April 2010 and the labor force at about two-thirds of the adult population, the Krueger, Cramer, and Cho (2014) subsequent exit rate of 30 percent implies the induced exits amounted to 0.88 percent of the adult population and thus a drop in the participation rate by that much. Weighting by shares in adult population (48.5 percent males, 51.5 percent females), the coefficients on lagged long-term unemployment in equations (1) and (2) cyclical influence in the period considered by Erceg and Levin, which ends six quarters before the period examined by the CEA. 10 Moreover, it is not clear that the cross-section state data provide as meaningful a basis for the analysis as the compositional and time series data used by the CEA and other studies.
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The broad thrust of these various studies is that approximately half of the decline in the participation rate from the end of 2007 to early 2014 is attributable to long-term structural trends, mainly the aging of the population. The findings of the present study suggest that the typical share of about one-half found in the various technical studies may be on the low side for the influence of aging.
ProjectIng PArtIcIPAtIon rAtes
Equations (1) and (2) (1) and (2) 11. In particular, if the response of active workers to becoming unemployed in a high-unemployment state is to move to a low-unemployment state and find new employment there, then even if there are no other changes the high-unemployment state will show a higher share of inactive population than before (and the receiving state a lower inactive share than before) even though there has been no change in the national participation rate. The correlations at the state level will essentially raise a fallacy of composition problem when interpreted as meaningful for the national level. The results presented here are subject to caveats about potentially misleading results from time series analysis. The participation rate has a downward trend, and the share of older workers, an upward trend.
It turns out that each series is nonstationary, meaning that it cannot be statistically rejected that the series has a random walk structure involving a unit root such that each observation equals the previous observation plus a random error. 13 However, if two nonstationary series are such that a linear combination of them is stationary, then they are cointegrated, and the usual ordinary-least-squares results hold (Verbeek 2008, 328) . A test finds that the two series are at least weakly cointegrated, implying that the results in equations (1) and (2) should be broadly valid.
14 Another way to examine the robustness of the results is to take advantage of the strong likely value of a Bayesian prior for the coefficient on the older worker share. As noted at the outset, the simple differential participation rates for the population 16 to 54 years old and the population 55 and over 12. "It may be … that as the labor market strengthens … labor force participation will remain flat instead of the demographic trend continuing to pull it down ..." Quoted in Craig Torres, "Yellen Watches American Paycheck for Signals on Shadow Slack," Bloomberg, July 16, 2014.
13. The Dickey-Fuller tests performed on first differences of the participation rate, or first differences after including a time trend, for the share of older workers, show the respective coefficients are not significantly different from zero, indicating unit roots.
14. Specifically, the male participation rate was first regressed on a constant, a time trend, and the older-worker share variable. Second, the series of residuals obtained by subtracting the fitted estimates from the actual participation rates was tested to see whether it contained serial correlation with lagged residuals. That correlation was rejected at approximately the 10 percent level using the (higher-than-usual) Dickey-Fuller t-statistic thresholds. has been more important than the former. The perception that demographics have mattered more than the Great Recession in reducing labor force participation is not widespread. On the contrary, most policy discussions among the informed public seem to emphasize that the decline in the participation rate has caused an illusory decline in unemployment, and by implication, that there would be a large rebound in the participation rate if successful recovery were achieved. Most technical studies, in contrast, attribute about one half of the decline in participation to aging of the population. Even that share may be understated, however.
The estimates here suggest that a decline of between 1.7 and 2.1 percentage points in the participation rate since late 2007 can be explained by the higher share of older cohorts in the population, combined with the characteristically lower labor force participation rates of the older population. Even so, as much as a 1 percentage point drop in the participation rate is found to be attributable to the discouragement impact of high unemployment (and high long-term unemployment). As a consequence, the progress in reducing US unemployment from its 2009 peak of 10 percent to 6.1 percent now might be seen as disguising the fact that the rate could still be as high as 7.6 percent if discouraging labor market conditions had not reduced the participation rate. Nonetheless, looking forward, little if any rebound can be expected in the labor force participation rate. The reason is that ongoing further reductions in participation from an aging population will almost exactly cancel out the rise in participation that can be expected from putting the Great Recession more fully in the past.
15. In the Bayesian test, the coefficients corresponding to those on the right side of equation (1), with t-statistics in parentheses, are as follows: 88.7 (278.7) for the constant, −0.89 (−9.0) for lagged unemployment, 0.057 (7.7) for the square of lagged unemployment, −0.30 (−5.1) for lagged long-term unemployment, and −0.25 (−4.3) for the 2008 and after dummy variable. The constant is virtually unchanged from equation (1) . The impact of going from 5 percent unemployment to 10 percent is modestly smaller in the Bayesian results (−0.17 percentage point change in participation) than in equation (1) 
